Traditionally, guerrilla insurgency theory has been essentialized into two schools of thought. The first, Guevarism is marked by its adherence to Che Guevara’s foco theory, which says that a revolutionary uprising can create the necessary social conditions for a successful socialist revolution. It is a radically vanguardist, derived from Marxist-Leninism and adapted for social, political, economic and geographic conditions of Latin America. The second, Maoism is more traditional and conservative in that it considers favorable conditions among the rural population to be a necessary prerequisite for staging a guerrilla insurrection(Also See Mao's Innovations in Popular Warfare. But both agree that the countryside is the only place where such an insurrection is to take place and victory decided. In their analysis the urban sphere is completely excluded as the site of legitimate, potentially successful guerrilla operations. Without this, such movements become simply “terrorists,” linguistically and conceptually separate from a tradition to which it rightfully belongs. Perhaps the most significant theorist in the urban guerrilla tradition is Abraham Guillén, a former fighter in the Spanish Civil War who moved to South America after escaping from one of Franco’s prison. He wrote extensively about the Tupamaros guerrillas of Uruguay, a movement he highlighted as providing a model used by other urban guerrilla movements on the continent in his essay “Problems of Revolutionary Strategy.” This essay has earned canonical status, as urban guerrilla groups throughout South America during the 1960’s and 1970’s were trained by Guillén and his manual. It develops a discourse on urban guerrilla strategy through an in-depth critique of revolutionary movements, both contemporary and historical. He draws on dozens of examples throughout the world, not just in Latin America, although this is where the bulk of his analysis is focused. This is compared to Guevara's “Guerrilla Warfare” in which his analysis is based entirely on his experience in the Sierra Maestra during the Cuban revolution. Because of the historically influential nature of Che and his writings, he has become almost synonymous with guerrilla insurgency. Criticisms of Che and his method are equated in many people's minds with the problematic nature of guerrilla warfare as a whole. As such, Guillén writings, particularly his critique of foquismo are a refreshing change from Guevara’s non-self-critical tome and a positive addition to the discourse of guerrilla warfare.
It is not immediately clear what distinguishes urban guerrilla movements from their rural counterparts, other than the fact that they operate in cities. As previously stated I hope to elucidate these characteristics using the framework outlined in the beginning of this paper as well as my own analytic insight. Despite their obvious and significant differences, the rural jungle and the so-called “urban jungle” serve the same purpose for the guerrilla, protection through concealment. Similar to rural guerrillas disappearing into the jungle after an attack on an urban center, the Tupamaros guerrillas of Uruguay retreated to the safety of Montevideo after their temporary occupation of Pando, a small town immediately outside the capital. Concealment, analogous to that which is provided by the density of vegetation in the mountains is found by utilizing the density of population and development in the urban environment. Additionally, the city provides anonymity due to the alienation and disassociation of people from each other that many argue is inherent in urban social relations. The concealing properties of both types of terrain allow the guerrilla to suddenly appear, strike and melt into their surroundings.
While some similarities can be found between the tactics and strategies of the two types of guerrillas, several major differences distinguish them. To begin with, the daily life of the urban guerrilla is far less involved with the insurgency than that of the rural. According to Abraham Guillén, the urban guerrilla should live separately and fight together with their comrades in arms . The rural guerrilla’s entire life is the insurgency; they live, eat, march, sleep and fight together, almost completely separated from society. But all types of guerrilla theory stress the importance of mobility and non-reliance on permanent terrain (in the country permanent bases, in the city safe houses or arm caches.
Additionally the nature and style of their violent actions are very distinct. To begin with, urban guerrilla groups usually contain far fewer active members than rural groups, as bombings and kidnappings require fewer troops. The rural guerrilla, while certainly assisted by acts of sabotage, fights very much like a conventional army in that their conflicts are primarily gun battles. While they are irregular forces and utilize certain tactics to gain an advantage over a technologically superior opponent, the rural guerrilla army is organized and behaves like a conventional army. The urban guerrilla tends to avoid gun battles if at all possible and prefers three main types of actions, ones that take full advantage of the urban environment and the benefits that it provides, all of which were utilized by the FLQ; armed robbery, kidnappings, and bombings. Armed robberies are obviously nothing new and no different in function than the supply raids of rural guerrillas. The urban guerrilla robs banks, gun stores, shooting ranges, and police and army barrack in order to gain both funds and munitions. Kidnappings are also sources of income for the urban guerrilla but also a potentially useful political tool. Some are merely acts of extortion while others, such as when a politician, member of the bourgeoisie, or their family member had the additional benefit of demonstrating the weakness of the government and implicitly the strength of the guerrilla, freeing political prisoners or supporting non-violent labor movements such as a unions on strike.
The urban guerrilla uses bombings for very much the same reason: to demonstrate the state’s lack of control, it's inability to maintain its monopoly on violence (as described by Weber and Foucault) and stop the bombing of civilians and infrastructure. Foucault sees politics and the states relationship to society as inherently violent, arguing that politics are an extension of war by other means , reformulating von Clausewitz’s famous adage . His theory of biopower argues that the modern state utilizes “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of population .” This is a kind of violence is omnipresent and invisible to those being controlled. Additionally, the state uses its various forms of legitimized violence to maintain its monopoly on means of violent coercion, by suppressing popular and non-state violence, i.e. riots, crime, guerrilla insurgency, etc. The urban guerrilla challenges this monopoly, the cornerstone of legitimized rule and therefore challenges the legitimacy of the state's existence.
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Apr 10, 2010
The Rural Guerrilla vs. the Urban Guerrilla (Updated)
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China,
Cuba,
Guerrilla Warfare,
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Tupamaros,
Urban Guerrilla Warfare
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5 comments:
Hi, my essay title is "Compare and contrast the phenomena of guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism."
Other than the key points raised in your article, do you think there is anymore differences?
Thanks
Jason
I expanded the post. Thanks for the incentive.
May I suggest a more imaginative title?
I would recommend "Fry the Brain", a decent study of modern urban guerrilla sniping.
With the explosion of the use of thermal imaging, drones, and night vision in standing armies, the rural guerrilla stands little chance in a fixed, conventional campaign.
Most successful, long-lived campaigns against standing armies have been urban-based in recent years. Look, the US CRUSHED Saddam's army in weeks. Yet the urban insurgency only grows stronger by the day. Same with Afghanistan. Look @ the Palestinians, IRA, Iraqi insurgents, the Chechens, etc. Look at the results of US Army vs Taliban pitched battles. Totally asymetric and one sided, especially at night. And think of the slaughter that would ensue if Hamas fought the IDF in a pitched battle! The days of the VC handing the US Army its butt are over. The VC strengths, especially at night, would amount to naught today. US troops would sit in their firebases while drones scouted and destroyed the VC fighters with thermals and indirect/direct fire. At night, the peasant VC army would stand no chance against American soldiers carrying $50,000 in the best night vision gear, backed up by millions of dollars worth of OH-58s and Predators.
I think that a lower key surgical urban insurgency vs. strictly defined targets WITH ABSOLUTELY NO COLLATERAL DAMAGE has the greatest possibility of winning propaganda and moral victories, at least until the forces are more equal. Only when a loyal civilian population and area has been secured can a more conventional campaign have any chance of success.
I have served in the US Army, and I tell you, you don't want to fight THAT standing army toe-to-toe.
Just my $.02, and inflation has rendered that worthless.
Justin
interesting post, but what about more current urban guerilla groups which didnt advertise themselves as such (ireland,iraq,ww2 resistance..etc)
secondly no urban guerilla movement (that i know off) has got past the 1st (or 2nd depends how you see it) stage of a revolution as detailed by mao.
now how would the 3rd step in urban guerilla warfare take place, contrary to rural guerillas the structure of the urban movements is much less suited for conventional warfare and a pitched battle could result in the destruction of the movement even with popular support (warsaw uprising,saigon,hue..etc)
Justin- Your points about the non-viability of potential rural guerrilla movement in light of modern day technology is well taken. But the same attitude prevailed during the Vietnam war; technological superiority means battlefield victory. I think that you place too much faith in these high tech systems. I recommend this article which examines how the Serbian Army thwarted attempts by the US to destroy its tanks, etc.
And your .02 if sold for scrap in Soviet Russia would help pay for your food ration, inflation be damned.
Anonymous- This is a selection from an academic paper that I wrote which only looked at movements from 1967-1972. As such it is not as comprehensive as I would like it to be.
Urban insurgency, in my opinion and that of urban guerrilla theorist Carlos Mariaghella can only succeed in overthrowing a regime if it complements an active rural insurgency, as it did in Algeria. Alone it can only succeed through moral and propaganda victories as a complement to a mass movement of the people. Urban guerrilla theory is a branch of foquismo not Maoism and does not seek to build a protracted people's war.
Thanks to all for the comments!
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